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AJOB Neuroscience

well as its meaning, and phenomenological descriptions
cannot overlook it. Does the phenomenon that interests us
take place in a particular context, say, a medical, political,
or academic one? If so, what bearing does this context have
on how the phenomenon is experienced by various agents?

Elliott, I., L. Lach, and M. L. Smith. 2005. I just want to be normal:
A qualitative study exploring how children and adolescents view
the impact of intractable epilepsy on their quality of life. Epilepsy
& Behavior 7(4): 664–78

Awareness of the Pliability of Experience

Gilbert, F. 2015. A threat to autonomy? The intrusion
of predictive brain implants. AJOB Neuroscience 6(4):
4–11.

Phenomenologists must avoid the error of treating experience or its forms as absolute constants that once altered are
forever destroyed. Experience is a dynamic system that is
constantly being shaped by our interpretation of the world
(Merleau-Ponty 2013; Heidegger 1996). Hence, inquiries
into different kinds of experiences must not only look at
the experiences themselves but also how they are interpreted and reinterpreted by actors in various situations.

Humility About the Reach of Theory
At its very core, phenomenology is a clarion call against
the tyranny of theory. Now, by this I do not mean that phenomenology is anti-intellectual or anti-theoretical (the
opposite is true). I mean instead that phenomenology has
historically made the case that the source of the most fundamental truths is not theoretical knowledge but lived
experience. Experience is the site where the most primitive
of norms are born (Pe~
na-Guzman 2013). As such, to remain
faithful to the spirit of phenomenological inquiry, one
must make the contents of theory answerable to the contents of experience and not the other way around.
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Do Predictive Brain Implants Threaten
Patient’s Autonomy or Authenticity?
Eldar Sarajlic, City University of New York
The development of predictive brain implant (PBI) technology that is able to forecast specific neuronal events
and advise and/or automatically administer appropriate
therapy for diseases of the brain raises a number of ethical issues. Provided that this technology satisfies basic
safety and functionality conditions, one of the most pressing questions to address is its relation to the autonomy of
patients. As Frederic Gilbert in his article (Gilbert 2015)
asks, if autonomy implies a certain idea of freedom, or
self-government, how can an individual be considered
to decide freely if the implanted device stands at the

inception of the causal chain producing his decisions?
He claims that PBIs threaten persons’ autonomy by
diminishing their postoperative experience of selfcontrol.
In this commentary, I discuss this claim. Contrary to
Gilbert, I suggest that PBIs do not pose a significant threat
to patient’s autonomy, as self-control, but rather to his or
her sense of authenticity. My claim is that the language of
authenticity, already introduced in the recent bioethical literature, may offer a better way to voice some of the concerns with PBIs that Gilbert recognized.
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Predictive Brain Implants

AUTONOMY
Gilbert takes over the definition of autonomy from Alfred
Mele (1995) and claims that autonomy refers to the person’s exercise of control over her choices. He reports the
experience of a patient who volunteered to be implanted
with an experimental PBI. The patient, who has suffered
from epilepsy seizures for more than 20 years, claims that
the device has given him more control over his life, thus
confirming that PBIs can be compatible with personal
autonomy. However, Gilbert suspects that this reported
control is not sufficient for autonomy because the phenomenology of autonomy, or the patient’s subjective experience of self-control, may be diminished due to the
influence of the device.
According to Gilbert, the persons with PBIs have no
control over the predictions or automated responses of the
devices, and thus have a diminished experience of acting
autonomously. Gilbert thinks this subjective experience of
autonomy is valuable because a person’s sense of autonomy is fundamental to postoperative iatrogenic harms.
Patients’ first-person view is a constitutive part of their
own narrative identity, and it enables them to “report
restorative or deteriorative feelings of autonomy and selfestrangement following surgery” (6). While a PBI provides
more sense of control to the patients, it simultaneously
makes them overly reliant on the device and thus prevents
them from recognizing potential risks and reacting to
“other stimuli that may guide them just as well” (8). When
patients’ decisional abilities are influenced by PBIs, they
may become passive and experience a sense of powerlessness that threatens their postoperative sense of control.
With overreliance on PBIs, “it is not clear where the realm
of decisional autonomy starts and where the realm of
advice ends” (8).
Although I do share these concerns about potential
effects of predictive brain implants, I think the language of
autonomy may not offer the best conceptual tool for recognizing and addressing the contentious issues at hand. I
propose we reconceptualize the problem by referring to
patients’ authenticity.

AUTHENTICITY
Consider Gilbert’s main claim again. While he seems to
concede that with the PBI the patients’ control over their
life is increased, rather than decreased (especially given
the reports by the volunteer patient), he suggests something similar, yet, as we shall see, sufficiently different:
The fact that persons with PBIs have no control over the
advice and predictions threatens their experience of autonomy. He doesn’t elaborate the potential difference between
autonomy and the experience of it. Is the person’s experience of self-control synonymous with autonomy? I suggest
not, because what Gilbert is describing seems more akin to
the concept of authenticity, rather than autonomy.
While autonomy refers to the agent’s ability for selfgovernance and rational reflection, authenticity introduces
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the idea that some elements of the person’s self outweigh
requirements of rational reflection and self-control (see
Varga 2012; Gugnon 2004). This is because some features
of the individual’s personality may be so fundamental to
his or her identity that overriding them through rational
reflection would endanger the cohesiveness of that person’s self. In cases of patients with brain diseases such as
epilepsy, by advising, or automatically preventing certain
outcomes, the PBI can alter the patient’s sense of identity
because the illness may have become an integral part of
his or her conception of self. The person perceives herself
and builds understanding of the world through the lens of
the disease (see the “case of the Dutch patient” elaborated
by Kraemer [2013a]; also see Kraemer [2013b]).
The postoperative sense of powerlessness and loss of
control may not necessarily be associated with the diminishing ability of the person to exercise control over his or
her actions. Contrary to that, as reported by the volunteer
patient, the sense of control over a patient life may even
increase. What may decrease, however, could be the
patient’s experience of control over his or her identity, and
the patient’s identity-based interaction with the environment. Therefore, a potential consequence of the introduction of PBIs to patients with brain diseases will be a partial
loss of authenticity. They may feel that they are not “their
usual selves” and experience a (partial, and as I suggest,
temporary) form of alienation from the core of their
identity.
This may be an encouraging development for the
patient. Being free from illness as a defining, if not constitutive, element of their old selves may be empowering and
liberating. However, this is also where the potential threat
of iatrogenic harm lies. If a person is accustomed to a certain identity-based relation to his or her surroundings, and
if the brain condition has become a part of the person’s
strategies of interaction and survival, the introduction of a
PBI may plausibly alter the person’s sense of familiarity
with the new structures of this relation. To understand
what I mean by this, consider one of the main dimensions
of the concept of authenticity developed by Alessandro
Ferrara (1998). Besides coherence, vitality, and maturity of
a person’s identity as a prerequisite for authenticity, Ferrara posits that depth is one of its constitutive conditions.
The dimension of depth, for Ferrara, “designates a person’s capacity to have access to his or her own psychic
dynamisms and to reflect such awareness in the construction of his or her identity” (Ferrara 1998, 96). It is plausible
to suggest that the introduction of a PBI to a person’s
everyday mode of psychological operation and social
interaction changes her psychic dynamism, including the
ways she understands herself and her relation to the
world. She may simultaneously exercise more control over
her actions, by being able to predict or automatically prevent a seizure with the advisory help of the PBI, but her
sensation of the depth of her identity will be altered by the
device, and can potentially lead to harms associated with
excessive (or unjustified) reliance on the PBI and the ensuing false sense of security. Patients could willingly get
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themselves in potentially harmful situations that they
would not have normally entered had their access to their
own psychic dynamism and the psychic structures for
interaction with the environment not been altered by the
PBI.

IS THREAT TO AUTHENTICITY A SERIOUS CONCERN?
The preceding discussion has tried to show that it is not
patients’ autonomy but their authenticity that is potentially
threatened by the PBIs. I believe the vocabulary of authenticity gives us a clearer picture of what may be a problem
with the introduction of this revolutionary medical
technology.
The vocabulary of authenticity can also indicate that
the ethical challenge PBI poses to the patients’ sense of
selves can be met and (hopefully) resolved. While any
threat to patients’ autonomy in medical practice is considered a serious hurdle to be overcome either by altering the way technology is applied and therapy
administered or by finding ways to increase patients’
control over their bodies, the problem with PBIs and
authenticity is easily resolvable. This is simply because
a person’s identity is permanently evolving, and
patients can recover the partial loss of authenticity
(gaining “depth”) by adapting gradually to the new
psychic dynamisms and learning how to navigate the
environment based on the introduction of the new element in their identities.

While challenging on its own right, this is not an insurmountable problem, since human identities are narrative
constructs that change over time, adapt to new realities,
and find ways to function well, or even flourish, despite
the illness. This suggests that a possible remedy to the partial loss of authenticity induced by the introduction of PBIs
should include postoperative adjustment therapies,
through which patients can reconceptualize their new
selves and learn to navigate the new structures of relating
to the world.
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Are Brain-Computer Interface (BCI)
Devices a Form of Internal Coercion?
Eran Klein, Oregon Health and Science University, Neurology Service, Portland Veterans
Administration Medical Center and University of Washington
Internal coercion has been proposed as an amendment to
standard criteria of autonomous choice in bioethics
(M€
uller and Walter 2010). Alongside a criterial triad of acting (1) with intention, (2) with understanding, and (3) with
freedom from overwhelming controlling influence of
others, internal coercion fills a perceived void (Beauchamp
and Childress 2013). Accounts of autonomy in bioethics
can leave out threats to autonomous choice that originate
from inside the person. Paradigmatic examples of internal
coercion include pathological conditions of the brain—
schizophrenia, severe depression, traumatic brain injury,
and others. It has been suggested that brain–computer

interface (BCI) devices be added to this list of potential
sources of internal coercion (Gilbert 2015). While BCI devices may threaten autonomy in important respects, it will
be argued that conceiving of such threats as a form of internal coercion is premature.
The notion of internal coercion in bioethics derives
largely from a rough, intuitive distinction between internal
and external threats to medical decision making. External
threats reside outside the individual. Medical professionals, family members, institutional representatives, all
those who interact with patients are a potential source of
external influence on medical decision making. Influence
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